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NOTES
ELECTRONIC TAX RETURNS AND THE
PREPARER PENALTIES
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1985, the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") ruled that developers of tax-preparation software may be considered return preparers.'
Thus, software companies who produce computer programs and sell
them to taxpayers for use in preparing income tax returns may be subject to preparer penalties. Unfortunately, since 1985 there has been no
further guidance given about how the penalties will be applied to
software developers. This is true although Congress, as a part of the
Revenue Reconciliation Act of 19892 ("1989 Act"), completely rewrote
the preparer penalties contained in the Internal Revenue Code (the
"Code"). The purpose of this Note is to examine how the penalties
should be enforced against software developers for an understatement
of a taxpayer's tax liability.
In recent years the development of tax-preparation software has
become an enormous growth industry.3 A major factor in this growth is
the introduction of electronic filing of federal income tax returns. Now,
for the first time in history,4 all United States taxpayers who are due a
refund may electronically file their federal income tax returns with the
IRS.5 However, the IRS has not yet fully developed a system that
would allow taxpayers who owe money to file electronically due to the
complexity of making electronic payments. 6 From its beginning in 1986,
the electronic filing program has grown from five participants process1. Rev. Rul. 85-189, 1985-2 C.B. 341.
2. Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 7721, 103 Stat. 2106 (1989) [hereinafter the 1989 Act].
3. See Sears Ties Loans to Electronic Filing,AM. BANKER, Nov. 1, 1989, at 7.
4. The Internal Revenue Service expanded electronic filing beginning with the 1989
tax year to include the entire United States.
5.

It is estimated that seventy percent of the 107 million returns that will be filed in

1990 are eligible to be filed electronically. Taxpayers Will Pay Premium for Filing Electronic Form 1040, Chicago Tribune, Feb. 4, 1990, at C9, col. 1.
6. Medearis, Firm's Software Offers Electronic Efficiency for Taxing Times Taxes:
Softview Inc., An Oxnard Maker of Tax PreparationSoftware, Hopes to Cash In On The
IRS Push Toward On-line Tax Filing, L.A. Times, Feb. 4,1990, at D4, col. 1.
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ing 25,000 electronic returns to 9,429 participants in 1989 processing
nearly 1,200,000 electronic returns. 7 By 1995, the IRS hopes to process
30 million individual tax returns 8 Electronic returns will eventually
become the norm. 9
The IRS attributes the overwhelming growth of electronic filing to
the benefits it provides to taxpayers, practitioners, and the federal government. For the taxpayer, the IRS promises considerably faster payment of refunds. 10 Also, individual taxpayers may have their refunds
deposited directly into their savings or checking account." For tax
practitioners, the IRS acknowledges receipt of return information
within forty-eight hours from the time of transmission. 12 Electronic filing allows practitioners to offer their clients a special service. However,
the biggest winner in electronic filing is the federal government. First,
electronic filing saves tax dollars since it reduces the cost for processing,
storing, and retrieving tax returns.'3 Second, electronic filing reduces
14
the problems of recruiting and training temporary workers each year.
Third, electronic returns have a much higher accuracy rate than paper
5
returns.1
Tax preparation software can run the gamut from passively providing blank forms to actively advising on substantial tax issues. Tax prep7. I.R.S. Publication 1345 at 1 (1990).
8. Late changes to law pose major problem for Electronic Filing, IRS Aide says.
DAILY TAx REP. Aug. 22, 1989.
9. Sing, The Dos and Don'ts of Electronic Tax Filing, L.A. Times, Dec. 23, 1989, at
D3, col. 1 (quoting a prediction by David Green, managing partner of Aider, Green & Hasson, a Los Angeles accounting firm that, "[by] the year 1995, electronic filing will be the
normal, accepted means of filing your individual and business tax returns, and by 2000,
the IRS will be 98% paper-free").
10. Refunds from electronic returns should take about three weeks, while paper returns can take four to ten weeks, depending on how early you file. Reid, The 1040 Form
Goes Electronic: IRS Promises That Computer Filing Will Speed Taxpayer Refunds,
Wash. Post, Jan. 26, 1990, at Al, col. 1.
11. Electronic Filing of Federal Tax Return&: Questions and Answers About the IRS
Electronic Filing Program,I.R.S. Publication 1336 (1990).
12. Id.
13. "[The] processing costs for an electronic return averages about 4 cents each, onetenth the cost of receiving and entering a return on paper." Reid, supra note 10, at Al,
col. 1 (quoting Wilson Fadley of the IRS).
14. Miastkowski, It's Tax Time; Ideas and Trends, Includes Related Article on Hints
on Buying a Tax Package, LoTus, Jan. 1989, at 9.
15. In 1989, the error rate on electronic returns was approximately three percent. Paper returns, on the other hand, averaged about sixteen percent. The IRS attributes this
"to the fact that electronic returns are verified for accuracy by the electronic filing
software and are not acknowledged as accepted until most errors are corrected." In addition, electronic returns do not contain simple errors of omission or mathematics since the
computer tax-preparation software have built-in error checking. I.R.S. Publication 1345
(1990).
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aration software generally puts simulated tax forms on the computer

screen, and then calculates an individual's taxes based on information
entered on the keyboard. The taxpayer will normally have the option
of printing the finished tax forms, which the taxpayer can then mail to
the IRS. Also, many software programs give the taxpayer the option of
filing electronically.
Many computer tax-preparation software programs also offer additional assistance. For example, a computer program may use a rulebased expert system 16 that prompts the taxpayer for information. From
this information, the program generates a list of income items and deductions specific to the taxpayer's situation. In addition, the software
may provide on-line help screens designed to provide guidance on substantive tax issues.
The IRS considers software that decides a taxpayer's eligibility for
a deduction or credit to be the riskiest because the taxpayer might take
a position not supported by authority. 17 An understatement of tax liability normally occurs here due to a misapplication or a misinterpretation of the tax laws when the developer designed the software. For
example, through a series of questions a program may conclude that the
taxpayer may take a home-office deduction even though the taxpayer
does not satisfy all the requirements.
Also, a developer's negligence may cause an understatement of tax
liability.' 8 For example, the software developer may fail to reprogram
the software to account for changes in the tax law. 19 As a result, the
computer program may fail to calculate correctly, or it may use the
wrong tax table. In addition to negligence by software developers in the
development of the preparation software, there are other examples of
negligence that deal more specifically with electronic filing.20 For example, the software developer may transmit incorrect or incomplete
data that differs from the data authenticated and verified by the taxpayer. An unauthorized third party may be able to intercept information from a taxpayer's return. The developer may fail to transmit
return data to the service or fail to transmit on time. Additionally, the
16. An expert system works by applying deductive principles to data in its database
which allows it to solve problems normally thought to require human intelligence. See
Note, Expert Software Systems: The Legal Implications, 8 COMPUTER/L.J. 455 (1988).
17. Soma and Thomas, Micro Tax Software for Tax Preparation,14 COLO. LAw. 393
(1985).
18. See infra text accompanying notes 112-113.
19. See Miastkowski, supra note 14, at 9. Late changes in the tax law are "a
nightmare for developers of tax software, who must scramble to incorporate the latest
changes and ship the updated software as far as in advance of January 1 as possible."
20. Niemic, The Electronic Tax Return. Is Paperless Filing Here?, 26 JuRIMETRics J.
138 (1985) at 157-58.
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developer may improperly disclose or control the return data, or fail to
comply with the electronic filing agreement. This Note will focus on
the negligent development of software.
This Note examines how and why the civil tax-preparer penalties
should be enforced on developers of tax-preparation software. It addresses how private actions by taxpayers to recover individual penalties
from software developers are an insufficient means of encouraging the
developer's compliance with the tax laws. This Note assumes that developers market their software nationwide through major software retailers for use by the public.2 ' This Note takes the position that the
existing theories of liability used by the IRS are sufficient for software
errors that result in an understatement of tax liability. This is true
when the understatement is caused by a misapplication or a misinterpretation of the tax laws or when the error is caused by the software
developer's negligence. The use of a computer should not alter the
standard of care.22 Yet, the use of a computer may require a reassessment of how an actor safely discharges these obligations. 23 In practice,
identical standards may result in stricter application for negligence by
software developers than for negligence by individual tax-preparers.
II.

POLICIES FOR SUBJECTING DEVELOPERS OF TAXPREPARATION SOFTWARE TO THE PREPARER
PENALTIES

When it applies tax preparer penalties to software developers, society must balance the benefits of expanding electronic filing against the
need to protect the integrity of the tax system. Imposition of penalties
will no doubt effect the use of tax-preparation software. Strict application of civil penalties will motivate both the production and the use of
more error-free software. Yet, too strict a penalty structure may have a
chilling effect on both the development and the use of computer
software.
For any penalty structure to be effective, the penalty imposed must
be high enough so that the cost of the penalty exceeds the cost of compliance. Yet, too strict a liability standard may deprive society of the
benefits of electronic returns. The ideal penalty structure should be
high enough to motivate software developers to prepare each line of
code as if every return is going to be audited. When evaluating the cost
of the penalty, a developer will consider both the penalty amount and
21. This Note will not discuss instances where a tax practitioner is using the software
to complete the returns of his customers.

22. See Nimmer & Krauthaus, Computer Error and User Liability Risk, 26
JuRImETRuCs J. 121 (1986).
23. Id
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its probability of being imposed. The IRS will only catch an error
through an audit of a customer of the developer. Since the current penalties are small, to produce a deterrence the IRS must employ an audit
system which catches most of the understatements the computer program produces. Moreover, to be effective, the IRS must enforce the
penalty every time it discovers the understatement. Since 1985, when
the IRS first ruled that preparer penalties may apply to software developers, there have been no reported cases of enforcement. It is not clear
whether this is due to of a lack of willingness to enforce the penalties or
a lack of an opportunity for enforcement.
Market forces and the availability of private actions by taxpayers
may also have an effect on compliance. Yet, as discussed below, neither
of these external factors are sufficient to protect the integrity of the tax
system. For continued expansion of electronic filing, taxpayers need to
know that they can rely on tax-preparation software to comply with the
tax laws.2 Failure to enforce tax preparer penalties effectively will
place a greater burden on taxpayers because insufficient motivation to
produce error-free software increases an individual's chances of having
to defend the imposition of a penalty. Thus, market forces may eventually drive error-prone software developers out of business. Yet, this will
not occur until the bad software victimizes taxpayers. It would not be
fair to penalize the taxpayer for an understatement caused by the
software if the developer is not penalized. Therefore, this method of
policing tax-preparation software is probably not the most desireable.
III.

PRIVATE ACTIONS ARE INSUFFICIENT TO PROTECT THE
INTEGRITY OF THE TAX SYSTEM

Private actions will often be too impractical for a single taxpayer
because of the litigation cost and the difficulty of recovering against a
software developer. Although the taxpayer may have both contractual
claims and tort claims, each claim presents its own barriers to recovery.
A.
1.

CONTRACTUAL CLAIMS

The Uniform Commercial Code

The first barrier the taxpayer must overcome when pursuing a
cause of action in contract is whether Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code ("U.C.C.") applies to software transactions. This has been
a subject of dispute for many years. In recent years, the bulk of author24. This Note does not suggest that reliance on tax-preparation software should be
cause for waiving the individual civil tax penalties. This subject is beyond the scope of
this Note. The taxpayer must believe that tax-preparation software is a reliable means of
completing their tax returns.
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ity and opinion considers computer software, especially mass-produced
software, to be a good, not a service.2 Thus, the U.C.C. should apply.
a, Warranties
The U.C.C. provides consumers with three possible warranties
under which to recover damages. These warranties include express
warranties, implied warranties of merchantability, and implied warranties of fitness for a particular purpose. Yet, these warranties do not provide the taxpayer with a viable solution since the software developer
may limit or disclaim all of them.
First, a taxpayer may seek recovery under a theory of breach of express warranty. The breach of express warranty includes the difference
in value between the defective and warranted software,26 plus incidental and consequential damages. 27 A seller creates an express warranty
when s/he makes a promise or an affirmation of fact about goods.28 The
difficulty is that express warranties usually appear with warranty disclaimers and limitations on remedies.29 Thus, the taxpayer may be prevented from claiming breach of warranty.
Second, a taxpayer may seek to recover under a theory of breach of
an implied warranty. The existence of an implied warranty does not depend on any claims by the seller. There are two types of implied warranties under U.C.C. Article 2 that may serve as protection for the
purchaser of tax-preparation software. First, since the developer is a
merchant with respect to the goods, an implied warranty of
merchantability arises.30 This is a warranty that the goods are fit for
the ordinary purposes for which the buyers use such goods.3 ' The second implied warranty is the implied warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose.3 2 This warranty exists when the seller knows the buyer's intention to use such goods for a particular purpose and the buyer is relying on the seller to furnish goods suitable for this purpose.33 This
warranty will usually exist since the developer specifically designed the
software for preparing tax returns. Yet, both implied warranties may
25. See RRX Industries, Inc. v. Lab-Con, Inc., 772 F.2d 543 (9th Cir. 1985) (held a California version of the U.C.C. to be applicable to a contract for the purchase of software
without any discussion of whether software is a good).

26. U.C.C. § 2-714(2) (1978).
27. Id. §§ 2-714(3), 2-715.
28. Id. § 2-313.
29. See Gemignani, Products Liability and Software, 8 RuTGERs J. COMPUTER TECH.
& L. 173, 177 (1981).
30. U.C.C. § 2-104 (1978).
31. Id. § 2-314.
32. Id. § 2-315.
33. Id.
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be disclaimed. An implied warranty of merchantability may be disclaimed either orally or in writing. The writing must be conspicuous,
and the word merchantability must appear in the written or oral disclaimer.34 The U.C.C. allows implied warranties of fitness for a particular purpose to be disclaimed by general language if the language is in
writing and is conspicuous.ss
b.

Breach of Contract

Unless the parties agree otherwise, the U.C.C. also provides that
the buyer often may recover consequential damages arising from any
breach of contract.w Unless unconscionable, 37 the U.C.C. provides that
consequential damages may be limited or excluded.-z This remedy may
not be satisfactory, however, since vendors typically limit liability by
excluding "indirect, special or consequential damages" and by making
replacement of the defective product the sole remedy.
2. Magnuson-Moss
The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act ("Magnuson-Moss") provides purchasers of "consumer
products" with additional protection against warranty disclaimers. 4°
Tax-preparation software packages sold directly to the public should be
34. Id. § 2-314(2).
35. Id § 2-316(2) at comment 4.
36. U.C.C. § 2-715 provides:
Consequential damages (include) any loss resulting from general or particular requirements and needs of which the seller at the time of contracting had reason to
know and which could not have been prevented by cover or otherwise; and injury
to person or property proximately resulting from any breach of warranty.
Id § 2-715.
37. The purpose of the doctrine is to prevent "oppression and unfair surprise and not
[to disturb an] allocation of risks because of superior bargaining power." Id § 2-302 at
comment 1.
38. Id § 2-719(3).
39. See Note, Expert Software Systems: The Legal Implications, 8 COMPUTER/L.J. 455,
469 (1988). ChipSoft, Inc.'s 1990 version of TURBOTAX contains the following
disclaimer:
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED ABOVE, AND SUBJECT TO ANY CONTRARY
PROVISIONS OF APPLICABLE STATE LAW, CHIPSOFT, INC. DISCLAIMS
ANY AND ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING WARRANTIES OF
MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE,
AND WARRANTY COVERAGE FOR INCIDENTAL OR CONSEQUENTIAL
DAMAGES.
Contrast this with MECA Corporation, the maker of ANDREW TOBIAS' TAXCUT, that
advertises that if TAXCUT calculates an error that causes an IRS penalty-MECA will
pay it.
40. 15 U.S.C. § 2301(1) (1982) (stating that consumer products are "any tangible property which is distributed in commerce and which is normally used for personal, family, or
household purposes").
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considered a "consumer product" even though it also may have commercial applications. 41 Where a dispute arises about whether the product is a "consumer product," there is a presumption favoring coverage. 42
Magnuson-Moss gives the consumer a choice of whether to sue under
the Act in state or federal court. 43 For federal jurisdiction the taxpayer
must satisfy the amount in controversy requirement. 44 This should be
sufficiently high to preclude most taxpayers from litigating in federal
court under Magnuson-Moss.
The primary purpose for Magnuson-Moss was to regulate the content and effect of written warranties for consumer products.45 Yet,
since Magnuson-Moss does not require warranties, and it only limits the
use of disclaimers, software manufacturers can avoid Magnuson-Moss's
disclaimer provisions by refusing to make warranties of any kind."
There is a distinction between full and limited warranties in
Magnuson-Moss. 4 7 If a manufacturer purports to make a full warranty, 48 then Magnuson-Moss prohibits the manufacturer from disclaiming implied warranties of any kind.49 If the manufacturer only
makes a limited warranty, then the manufacturer may limit the duration of the implied warranty. 5° The manufacturer may not disclaim or
modify any implied warranty to a consumer with respect to the product.5 ' In addition, Magnuson-Moss provides that any disclaimer or limitation of implied warranties that violates the statute is ineffective for
52
purposes of federal and state law.
Magnuson-Moss also requires disclosure of any legal remedies available to the consumer in the contents of a written warranty. 53 Although
Magnuson-Moss provides taxpayers with additional protection, it per41. 16 C.F.R. § 700.1(a) (1984).
42. Id.
43. 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(1) (1988).
44. Id. § 2310(d)(3).
45. Note, Taking the "Byte" Out of Warranty Disclaimers, 5 COMPUTER/L.J. 531
(1985)[hereinafter Warranty Disclaimers].
48. Id.
47. 15 U.S.C. § 2303(a) (1982).
48. Code section 2303(9)(a)(1) requires that, in order to label a warranty a "full warranty," the supplier or seller must stand behind the product by agreeing to fix or replace
defective parts at no cost and by granting the consumer an option of either replacement
or a full refund where the consumer's product cannot be fixed satisfactorily after a reasonable number of attempts. Id. § 2304(a).
49. Id. §§ 2304(a)(2), 2308(a).
50. Id. § 2308(a),(b). The warranty may limit the "duration of a written warranty of
reasonable duration if such limitation is conscionable and is set forth in clear and unmistakable language and prominently displayed on the face of the warranty." Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. § 2308(c).
53. Id § 2302(a)(9).

1990]

ELECTRONIC TAX RETURNS

mits exclusions or limitations of consequential damages for breach of
warranties. 54 The exclusion or limitation must appear conspicuously on
the face of the warranty.s5
B.

PRIVATE TORT ACTIONS

Although software developers may avoid liability in contractual
causes of action through the use of disclaimers, contractual disclaimers
do not bar recovery in tort. Still, a consumer pursuing recovery under
tort theories faces many problems in proving his or her case. The tort
remedies that may be available to taxpayers include: negligence, strict
product liability, and misrepresentation. This Note discusses the fact
that most taxpayers will have difficulty rpcovering purely economic
losses in tort actions and how each of these potential remedies pose
their own barriers to recovery.
1. Recovery of Purely Economic Loss
The majority of jurisdictions do not permit the recovery of economic lossss in tort actions. 57 Tort law traditionally has been concerned
with redressing injuries which involve physical harm.ms The seminal
case adopting this rule is Seely v. White Motor Company.59 The plaintiffs in Seely sought to recover lost profits and a refund of the purchase
price of a defective truck. In Seely, California Supreme Court Justice
Peters' concurring and dissenting opinion indicated that defects in the
54. Id. §§ 2304(a)(3), 2302(a)(6).
55. Id.
56. The definition of "economic loss" adopted by courts which have considered this
issue is "the diminution in the value of the product because it is inferior in quality and
does not work for the general purposes for which it was manufactured and sold." See
Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 652 F.2d 1165, 1169 (3rd Cir.
1981) (quoting Comment, Manufacturer'sLiability to Remote Purchasersfor 'Economic
Loss' Damages-Tort or Contract?,114 U. PA. L. REv. 539, 541 (1966)). The items most
frequently sought as damages for unsuitable products are the reduction in value caused by
the defect, costs of repair or replacement, and loss of profits. Id.
57. See East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 868
(1986); Sanco, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 579 F. Supp. 893, 896 (D. Ind. 1984).
58. The distinction between economic loss and physical injury has been stated as
follows:
There can be no doubt that the seller's liability for negligence covers any kind of
physical harm, including not only physical injuries, but also property damage to
the defective chattel itsef, as where an automobile is wrecked by reason of its
own bad brakes .... But where there is no accident and no physical damage, and
the only loss is a pecuniary one, through the loss of the value or use of the thing
sold, courts have adhered to the rule ... that purely economic interests are not
entitled to protection against mere negligence.
Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp., 652 F.2d at 1170 n.15 (citing W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTs
§ 101 (4th ed. 1971))(emphasis in original).
59. 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965).
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quality of goods and economic losses were not recoverable from the
manufacturer under the theory of strict liability, and that these types of
losses should be relegated to the law of contracts governing commercial
6°
transactions, i.e., to express and implied warranties.
In his opinion for the majority, Justice Traynor analyzed the types
of risks protected by the laws of tort and contract and explained the
policy reasons underlying the rule that economic losses should only be
recoverable in contract.
The distinction that the law has drawn between tort recovery for physical injuries and warranty recovery for economic loss is not arbitrary
and does not rest on the 'luck' of one plaintiff in having an accident
causing physical injury. The distinction rests, rather, on an understanding of the nature of the responsibility a manufacturer must undertake in distributing his products. He can appropriately be held
liable for physical injuries caused by defects by requiring his goods to
match a standard of safety defined in terms of conditions that create
unreasonable risks of harm. He cannot be held for the level of performance of his products in the consumer's business unless he agrees
that the product was designed to meet the consumer's demands. A consumer should not be charged at the will of the manufacturer with bearing the risk of physical injury when he buys a product on the market.
He can, however, be fairly charged with the risk that the product will
not match his economic expectations unless the manufacturer agrees
that it will. Even in actions for negligence, a manufacturer's liability is
limited to damages for physical injuries and there is no recovery for
61
economic loss alone.
In Sanco, Inc. v. Ford Motor Company,62 the court adopted the majority rule as articulated by Justice Traynor and held that, in a negligence action, the plaintiff, Sanco, would be permitted to recover neither
the costs of repairing the defective trucks it purchased from the defendant, Ford Motor Company, nor for the profits lost due to the truck's
down time. Instead, the plaintiff's remedy lies in the expectation-bargain protection of warranty law. 63 The court reasoned that:
...tort action traditionally presupposes that the plaintiff has been exposed to an unreasonable risk of injury to his person or his property.
Qualitative defects which merely disappoint the buyer's expectations of
the product's performance do not expose the user or his property to
any risk of physical harm. When a product does not perform as expected, the buyer's remedy should be governed by the rules of contract,
64
which traditionally protect expectation interests.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

63 Cal. 2d at 20, 403 P.2d at 153, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 25.
63 Cal. 2d at 18, 403 P.2d at 151, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 23.
579 F. Supp. 893 (D. Ind. 1984).
Id at 899.
Id. at 897.
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The court recognized that imposing tort liability on a manufacturer
would increase the cost of doing business. The court believed that the
increased cost is justified when a product causes personal injury or even
when it causes damage to itself or other property. However, the court
did not believe that increased costs are justified when a product causes
only economic loss.65 The court reasoned that society has a great interest in spreading the cost of physical injuries. Yet, when a plaintiff has
suffered only economic loss the court stated that the societal interest in
cost spreading was insufficient to justify requiring "the consuming public to pay more for their products so that a manufacturer can insure
against the possibility that some of his products will not meet the . . .
needs of some of his customers." 66 The court also agreed with Justice
Traynor's conclusion in Seely that subjecting a manufacturer to liability
under a tort theory would be inappropriate in that it would represent
an unwarranted extension of tort law into the decision of the legislature
67
to enact the sales provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code.
Finally, the court noted that the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 68
was in apparent agreement with the majority rule. The court interpreted the Restatement as stating that "a manufacturer is to be liable
for 'physical harm' caused by its negligence in the manufacture of a
chattel dangerous unless carefully made." 69 The court points out that
the Restatement section does not extend the manufacturer's liability to
70
encompass purely economic loss.
At the same time, a minority of jurisdictions allow recovery for economic loss in tort. The United States Supreme Court in East River
Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc. enumerated the rationales for this result.7 ' First, the Court stated that those courts which
reject the Seely approach do so because they find it arbitrary that economic losses are recoverable if a plaintiff suffers bodily injury or property damage, but not if a product injures itself. Second, they find no
inherent difference between economic loss and personal injury or property damage, because all are proximately caused by the defendant's conduct. Finally, the minority courts believe recovery for economic loss
would not lead to unlimited liability because they think a manufacturer
can predict and insure against product failure.
In addition, the Court in East River recognized an intermediate po65. Id.
66. Id. (citing Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 18; 403 P.2d 145, 151; 45 Cal.
Rptr. 17, 23 (1965)).
67. Id at 898.
68. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 395 (1965).
69. Sanco, 579 F. Supp. at 893.
70. I&
71. 476 U.S. 858, 868-71 (1986).
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sition in which a tort action would be allowed if the defective product
creates a situation potentially dangerous to persons or other property,
and loss occurs as a proximate result of that danger and under dangerous circumstances. 72 In this suit in admiralty law, the court rejected
both the minority view and the intermediate position and held that a
manufacturer in a commercial relationship has no duty under either a
negligence or a strict products liability theory to prevent a product from
73
injuring itself which results in purely economic loss.
2. Negligence
Even in jurisdictions that allow recovery of purely economic damages, it is extremely difficult to prove negligence by a software developer. A cause of action based on negligence requires proof of the
following elements. 74 The taxpayer must show: 1) that the developer
owes a duty of care to the plaintiff based upon a certain standard of conduct; 2) that the developer breached this duty; and 3) that the breach
75
proximately caused the understatement of tax liability.
Scholars are in agreement that a software manufacturer owes a
duty of care to the purchaser of his or her software. 76 The difficult
question is to what standard of care will a software developer be held.
Although the traditional test is one of reasonable care, 77 most commentators agree that the current lack of articulated competence standards
in the programming industry makes the familiar techniques of framing
a uniform standard futile. 78 Moreover, even after the courts decide
upon a standard of care, the complexity of software development compounds the difficulty of finding negligence. The plaintiff must prove
that the manufacturer breached its duty, a very difficult thing to prove.
The relative youth of the computer industry prevents courts from ade79
quately relying on trade custom and usage to find a breach of duty.
Further, no established professional codes of conduct or industry standards exist to guide programmers.8 0 Thus, courts cannot rely on com72. I

at 869-70.

73. Id. at 870.
74. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 30 (5th ed. 1984).
75. Id.
76. Gemignani, supra note 29, at 189.
77. "[R]easonable man of ordinary prudence", "(b]ut if a person in fact has knowledge, skill, or even intelligence superior to that of the ordinary person, the law will demand of that person conduct consistent with it." See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra
note 74, at § 32.
78. Frank, Tort Adjudication and the Emergence of Arttficial Intelligence Software,
21 SuFFoLK U.L. REV. 623, 629 (1987).
79. Warranty Disclaimers,supra note 45, at 546.
80. Id.
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mon practices of others in the industry to guide their decision-making.8 '
The shortcut of res ipsa loquitur probably would not apply to help
the plaintiff to prove that the developer breached his/her duty.s 2 Given
the complexities of computers, one cannot say that errors usually do not
occur without negligence.s 3 Yet, a court may conclude that tax preparation software has become so commonplace and straightforward that errors usually arise only due to negligence and, thus, the doctrine may
apply. s 4 In any event, the plaintiff would still have to show that, more
likely than not, the negligence was the defendant's and not that of a
third person or the plaintiff him/herself.
Under common law principles of negligence, the program's defect
must cause the consumer's injury.s5 Like many other cases involving
negligence the problem of causation is difficult to prove. Yet, proving
causation may not be insurmountable with respect to mass produced
computer software. A software error is often reproducible because the
s
program can be rerun multiple times.8
If a program fails the same way
every time and produces the same error every time then a defect may
be presumed.8 7 If on the other hand, it later runs perfectly, the taxpayer will find it much more difficult to prove that the software caused
the tax deficiency.
Even if the consumer successfully proves that the manufacturer
was negligent in developing the program, the manufacturer has several
defenses. Contributory negligencess or assumption of risk,8 9 for example, might be available. Either of these theories, if successfully proven
by the manufacturer, can relieve him or her of liability. Contributory
negligence may arise in the use of tax-preparation software if the customer tries to use the program beyond its capabilities or is negligent in
following the program's instructions. Alternatively, a software developer may argue that the taxpayer assumed the risk of a new technology.
3.

Strict ProductLiability
Strict liability poses its own obstacles to recovery. 9° First, section
81. Id.
82. See Gemignani, supra note 29, at 191.

83. Id.
84.
& L. 1,
85.
86.
87.
88.

Nycun, Liabilityfor Malfunction of a Computer Program,7 J. COMPUTERS, TECH.
12 (1979).
W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 74, at § 30.
Gemignani, supra note 29, at 195.
Id.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF

TORTS § 463 (1965).

89. Id. § 496A.
90. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A provides:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
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402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts specifically mentions that
the defective product must have caused "physical harm." Therefore, as
discussed earlier, courts have been hesitant in awarding damages in
strict liability for purely economic losses. 91 Since a federal income tax
deficiency would be an economic loss, most jurisdictions will not apply
strict liability.
A second obstacle that the consumer must overcome is that s/he
would have to prove that the product is defective and that the defect is
unreasonably dangerous. 92 Consumers in California have an easier time
since that state no longer requires that the consumer prove that the
product was unreasonably dangerous. 93 In California, the plaintiff only
has to prove that the product is defective and that it caused the injury.
In Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp.," the California Supreme Court stated
that "a requirement that the plaintiff also prove that the defect made
the product 'unreasonably dangerous' places upon him a significantly
increased burden and represents a step backward in the area pioneered
by the court."' 9 5
The two defenses to a charge of strict liability are product misuse"
and assumption of risk.97 In addition, courts will not apply strict liabilto the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate consumer, or to this property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of
his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not brought the product from or entered into
any contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 402A (1965).
91. Gemignani, supra note 29, at 197.
92. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
93. Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 134:35, 501 P.2d 1153, 1163, 104 Cal.
Rptr. 433, 443 (1972) (reasoning that such a requirement is inappropriate in a products liability suit).
94. 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972).
95. 8 Cal. 3d at 133, 501 P.2d at 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 442.
96. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment h provides that "[a] product is
not in a defective condition when it is safe for normal handling and consumption. If the
injury results from abnormal handling ... the seller is not liable." RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment h (1965).
97. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment n provides:
the form of contributory negligence which consists in voluntary and unreasonably proceeding to encounter a known danger, and commonly passes under the
name of assumption of risk, is a defense under this section as in other cases of
strict liability. If the consumer discovers the defect and is aware of the danger,
and nevertheless proceeds unreasonably to make use of the product and is injured by it, he is barred from recovery.
IM comment n.

1990]

ELECTRONIC TAX RETURNS

ity if the danger posed was unavoidable due to the current state of art
at the time of manufacture. 98
4.

Tortious Misrepreentation

The taxpayer may have an additional cause of action if the software
developer misrepresents the attributes or the capabilities of its product.
The two types of tortious misrepresentation are intentional and negligent misrepresentation. Intentional misrepresentation, or fraud, requires a showing that the software developer intentionally made a false
statement of a material fact upon which the taxpayer reasonably relied
his or her detriment. 99 "Mere 'puffing' or predictions about future performance are not actionable."' 1 ° Most jurisdictions will not allow a negligent misrepresentation claim where unintentional misrepresentations
are not actionable in contract due to a warranty disclaimer 1° ' because
recognition of this type of action would defeat the purpose of the con02
tractual disclaimer.
IV. PREPARER PENALTIES AND COMPLIANCE
A.

ALL DEVELOPERS OF TAX-PREPARATION SOFTWARE SHOULD BE
CONSIDERED RETURN PREPARERS

An income tax preparer is either someone who prepares a return
for compensation or employs a person to prepare a return for compensation. 10 3 The preparer does not necessarily have to be the person who
mechanically enters the figures on a return. It is sufficient to furnish a
taxpayer or another preparer with enough information and advice to
make completing the return or the claim for a refund largely a mechanical or clerical matter. ° 4 Thus, a person may be considered an income
tax preparer even if they did not review the information on the return
or the claim for a refund. 10 5 Yet, anyone who merely furnishes typing,
reproducing, or other mechanical assistance is not an income tax return
06
preparer.
If it can be determined that the role of software developers goes be98. See Bruce v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 544 F.2d 442, 447 (10th Cir. 1976).
99. See Warranty Disclaimers,supra note 45, at 551.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. I.R.C. section 7701(a)(36)(A) defines an income tax return preparer as "any person who prepares for compensation, or who employs one or more persons to prepare for
compensation, any return of tax imposed by subtitle A, or any claim for refund of tax imposed by subtitle A." I.R.C. § 7701(a)(36)(A) (1982).
104. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-15(a)(1) (1982).
105. Id.
106. I.R.C. § 7701(a)(36)(B)(i) (1988).
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yond mechanical assistance, they may be held liable for preparer penalties. I 0 7 It is not clear where the IRS draws the line for mere
mechanical assistance. However, the IRS will consider the software developer to be an income tax preparer if the program determines a taxpayer's eligibility for various deductions and credits.1 6 8 Thus, if using
the computer program results in an understatement of tax liability for
the taxpayer, the software company may be subject to a penalty under
section 6694 of the Code.109 The rationale behind this provision is that
an individual who buys tax-preparation software may be unaware that
the program is incomplete or inadequate and, therefore, may use it to
create an erroneous return.110 Additionally, because tax-preparation
software may be used by other tax practitioners, both the tax practitioner and the software developer may be subject to the penalty."' On
the other hand, surely the IRS will not consider the seller of programmable calculators an income tax preparer simply because the calculator
could be used to help prepare returns. Yet, it is not clear how the IRS
will classify a software program that operates somewhere in between
these two extremes.
The best policy is for the IRS to consider all developers of software
to be income tax preparers if the software is designed to produce a completed return. Taxpayers are just as likely to rely on the software regardless of the level of its sophistication. It is unrealistic to expect
taxpayers to double check the output of the computer program.
As a policy matter, society should encourage taxpayers to file their
returns electronically. To require the taxpayer to challenge the taxpreparation software, to seek a second opinion, or to try to monitor the
software on the provisions of the Code themselves would nullify the
very purpose of using the software. Moreover, a computer program, especially where it is making simple calculations, will be no more accurate with human intervention. 112 Since individuals are not infallible,
human errors may often override otherwise accurate computer
information. 113
107. One interesting twist is that the IRS stated that they will not, until further notice,
assert the preparer penalties, with respect to a cain or refund, prepared after December
31, 1989 against a preparer who is not required to sign the return. However, this is proba-

bly not the IRS's intent. I.R.S. Notice 90-20, 1990-1 C.B. 328.
108. Rev. Rul. 85-189, 1985-2 C.B. 341.
109. I.R.S. News Release IR-86-62 (May 5, 1986).
110. Id.
111. See Rev. Rul. 85-187, 1985-2 C.B. 338.
112. See Nimmer & Krauthaus, supra note 22, at 128.
113. Id.
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B. How THE PREPARER PENALTIES SHOULD BE APPLIED TO
DEVELOPERS OF TAX-PREPARATION SOFTWARE

1.

Background

Tax penalties help to preserve the integrity of the tax system, and
have been a part of the tax laws since the Revenue Act of 1913.114 Congress added section 6694 with the Tax Reform Act of 1976 to regulate
income tax preparers."15 Before 1976, preparers were subject only to
criminal penalties for willfully helping in the preparation of a fraudulent return.1 1 6 Congress found that these criminal penalties were inadequate." 7 Thus, Congress added section 6694 primarily to deter
preparers from engaging in negligent or fraudulent practices designed
to understate tax liability. 118
In 1989, Congress completely rewrote the preparer penalties for understatement" 9 of taxpayer liability. Section 6694(a), as amended by
the 1989 Act, imposes a penalty of $250 if any part of an understatement
of tax on a return or claim for refund is attributable to "a position for
which there was not a realistic possibility of being sustained on its merits.' 20 Further, the preparer must have known or should have known
of this position and it was not disclosed or it was frivolous. 12 The
preparer may avoid the penalty by showing that there was reasonable
cause for the understatement and that s/he acted in good faith. 122 The
1989 Act increased the penalty for wilful or reckless conduct from $500
to $1,000.123
The statute does not define "realistic possibility of being sustained
on the merits." The legislative history suggests that Congress intended
the new standard to be stricter than the "old negligent behavior" standard. 124 Yet, the new standard does not require certainty.' 25 Nor does
114. See JOINT COMMrIEE ON TAXATION, DESCRIPrON OF TAX PENALTIES, JCS-9-88,
100th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1988), Joint Committee Print, JCS-9-88, prepared by the Staff of
the Joint Committee on Taxation.
115. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1203, 90 Stat. 1520 (codified at 26
U.S.C. 6694); see also Brockhouse v. United States, 749 F.2d 1248, 1251 (7th Cir. 1984).
116. See H.R. REP. No. 658, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 273-76, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2897, 3169-71.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 278, 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at 3174.
119. See I.R.C. § 6694(e) (West Supp. 1989) (provides in pertinent part: "'understatement of liability' means any understatement of the net amount payable with respect to
any tax imposed by subtitle A or any overstatement of the net amount creditable or refundable with respect to such tax").
120. d.
121. Id. § 6694(a).
122. Id.
123. Id § 6694(b).
124. Rev. Proc. 90-20, 1990-10 I.R.B. 17.
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it require a preparer to conclude that the position is more likely than
not to succeed. 12 6 The IRS says, for example, that it will
treat a position as having a realistic possibility of being sustained on its
merits if reasonable and well-informed analysis by a person knowledgeable in the law would lead such a person to conclude that the position
has approximately a one in three, or greater, likelihood of being sustained on the merits.'l 7
This standard is applicable to lawyers and certified public accountants.I 2s The IRS will not impose the preparer penalties to non-frivolous
positions if the preparer sufficiently discloses the position on the return
or claim for refund.' 9 Negligent behavior that would have been subject
to the penalty under former section 6694 of the Code will continue to be
subject to the penalty as amended by the Act. 130 Neither the Act nor
the legislative history suggests how the amendments apply to developers of tax-preparation software.
2.

Application to Understatements Caused by Misapplicationor
Misinterpretation

Liability standards for understatements caused by misapplications
or misinterpretations of the tax laws should have the same practical effect when applied to either software developers or individual tax-practitioners. First it must be determined whether there is "a realistic
possibility of being sustained on the merits." Like an individual taxpractitioner, the software developer would have to show that a person
knowledgeable in the tax law would conclude that after a reasonable
and well informed analysis, that the position had approximately a one
in three or greater chance of being sustained on the merits. If not, the
IRS may impose a penalty unless the program includes a disclosure
statement as part of the return. The disclosure statement should satisfy
section 6662(d)(2)(B)(ii). Still, a disclosure statement will not be a defense to a frivolous position.
One may argue that software developers should be held to a higher
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.

128. COM. REP. ON THE OMNInus BuDGET RECONCILIATION AcT
101-239 (1989), reprinted in 10 Fed. Taxes (P-H) 61586.

OF

1989, Pub. L. No

129. The IRS has determined that for purposes of section 6694, disclosure is sufficient
if it constitutes adequate disclosure for purposes of section 6662(d). I.R.C. § 6694(a)(3)
(1982). In addition, I.R.C. section 6662(d)(2)(B)(ii) provides in pertinent part: '"The
amount of the understatement... shall be reduced by that portion of the understatement
which is attributable to... any item with respect to which the relevant facts affecting the
item's tax treatment are adequately disclosed in the return or in a statement attached to
the return." Id. § 6662(d)(2)(B)(ii).

130. Id. § 6694.
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standard than individual tax-practitioners since an incorrect position
contained in a computer program will affect many more returns than
one taken by an individual preparer. Yet, this is not always true. Many
individual tax-practitioners work for large organizations and these individuals may simply be applying the law as set forth in the company policy and procedures. If this is the case, the same misinterpretation of the
tax laws is likely to result in many errors.
There are countervailing policy arguments that support not having
a stricter standard applied to software developers than is applied to individual tax-practitioners. First, like individual tax practitioners,
software developers owe a duty' 3 ' to promote the best interests of their
customers by minimizing tax liabilities while maximizing their total return. Too strict a standard may cause a conflict of interest. Software
companies may become so preoccupied with avoiding the penalties that
they may sacrifice the interest of their customers. Second, in addition
to increasing the occurrences of errors, more returns also create a builtin deterrent against risky software. The greater the number of returns
prepared means the greater the chance that one of the software developer's returns will be audited. Therefore, a software developer is at a
greater risk of being caught and subjected to a penalty. Third, too strict
a standard would have a chilling effect on software developers willing
to take unsettled positions in the tax law. Ultimately, this may reduce
the number of tax cases that challenge controversial areas of the
Code. 132
Also, there are policy arguments for not applying a lesser standard
of liability to software developers. In addition to owing a duty to their
33
customers, tax preparers also have a responsibility to the tax system.
They must, therefore, limit their advice to what is legal, ethical, and
reasonable under the Treasury Regulations and the Code. The integrity
of our voluntary self-assessment tax system relies not only on taxpayer
compliance with the revenue laws, but also on practitioner guidance. 134
In summary, although tax-preparation software has a greater
probability of non-compliance with the tax laws, there are sufficient offsetting social benefits to warrant imposing the same standard on
software developers and individual practitioners.
131. The duties may have different sources. For instance, the tax-practitioner may be
under both a professional and a contractual duty, whereas the software developer may be
under a contractual duty only.

132. See generally Note, Painting the Gray Zone Grayer: Why Substantial Authority
Fails as a Replacement for the Reasonable Basis Standardin Assessing PractitionerConduct Under Circular230, 8 VA. TAX R. 743 (1989).
133. Id.

134. Id.
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Application to UnderstatementsResultingfrom Negligence

Unlike suits alleging misapplication or misinterpretation of the tax
laws, a negligence suit against a software developer for understatement
of tax liability is not likely to be sustained on the merits. The software
developer will be unable to show that a person, knowledgeable in the
tax law, would conclude, after a reasonable and well-informed analysis,
that the position had approximately a one in three chance or greater of
being sustained on the merits. No authority would support this position. Yet, the software developer may claim that it had a reasonable basis for its position and that it acted in good faith.
To determine what is a reasonable basis one needs to look at the
negligence provisions of the prior law. Under the prior law, a return
preparer was subject to a penalty for an understatement due to the
preparer's negligent or intentional disregard of the rules or regulations. 13 The courts defined negligence as a lack of due care or a failure
to do what a reasonable and prudent person would do under the circumstances.' 36 The tax preparer had the burden of proof on the issue of
whether the preparer had negligently or intentionally disregarded a
1 37
rule or regulation.
Here, the same liability standard has a much stricter practical effect on software developers than on individuals. Errors caused by a
software developer that results in understatements of its user's tax liability will rarely, if ever, be upheld under the negligence provisions of
the prior law.
a. Guidelines For The Application of PreparerPenalties Under the
Negligence Standard
In 1980, the IRS set forth factors to be considered in determining
whether to assert the preparer penalties.138 The fact finder will adjudge the nature of the error causing the understatement, the frequency of errors, and the materiality of errors. When the above factors
suggest negligence, the fact finder will then consider the preparer's office in order to decide if the penalty should be applied.' 39 Neither the
135. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 7732(a),
103 Stat. 2106, 2402 (amended 1989). Prior to 1989, the penalty was $100 for negligence
and $500 for wilful misconduct.
136. Marcello v. Commissioner, 380 F.2d 499, 506 (5th Cir. 1967), cert denied, 389 U.S.
1044 (1968).
137. Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-1(a)(5) (1986).
138. Rev. Proc. 80-40, 1980-2 C.B. 774, 775. Revenue Procedure 80-40 was actually a
modification of a harsher rule which had been issued earlier in Revenue Procedure 80-28,
1980-1 C.B. 304. In Revenue Procedure 80-28, the IRS did not take into account the materiality of the tax nor the degree of the preparer's oversight.
139. Id.
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IRS nor the courts have given any guidance as to how these factors
would be applied to an understatement caused by an error in a taxpreparation program. The following disscussion attempts to show that
an understatement resulting from a software developer's negligence
will rarely, if ever, be upheld under these IRS guidelines.
i.

Nature of the Error Causing the Understatement

The fact finder will consider both the complexity of the provision
in question and the ease with which it could be detected upon inspection. First, the fact finder must decide whether "the provision that was
misapplied or not discovered was so complex, uncommon, or highly
technical that a competent preparer of returns of the type at issue
might reasonably be unaware or mistaken as to its applicability."' 14
Second, the fact finder must decide whether "a general review of the
return would have disclosed the error to the preparer. '141 The IRS in
Revenue Procedure 80-40 provides that "an isolated mathematical or
clerical error ordinarily reflects no more than mere inadvertence.
Thus, it will not result in the assertion of the penalty, unless such an
error may be of such magnitude or be so conspicuous that it should
142
have been discovered after its commission."'
Unfortunately, neither the cases nor the rulings define "complex"
nor do they determine how much knowledge is necessary to avoid the
imposition of the penalty. In applying this provision to a software developer, there are several issues that must be addressed. First, to whom
should we compare software developers to decide if they acted reasonably? For instance, should we compare software developers only to
other software companies, or to all return preparers? Second, if we decide to compare to all other developers, how does one define a reasonable software developer and should we hold software developers to a
standard higher than that to which individuals are held?
No income provision is so complex, uncommon, or highly technical
that the trier of fact should find the software company to be unaware of
or mistaken about its applicability. The IRS should not allow software
developers that market their products to consumers to claim that a tax
provision, applicable to individuals, is beyond the capabilities of their
programs. Unlike individual tax-practitioners, software developers who
market their product through some general distribution chain cannot
140. Id
141, Id
142. Id. See also Rev. Rul. 80-262, 1980-2 C.B. 375 ("An inadvertent error made by a
return preparer in either listing or totaling on Schedule B, Form 1040, the separate
amounts shown on Forms 1099-INT furnished by a taxpayer that does not result in substantial understatement of tax and is the only error on the return does not subject the
preparer to the negligence penalty under section 6694(a) of the code.").
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control the expertise of the buyer. 1'
Individual tax-practitioners have
much more flexibility in limiting the types of returns they choose to
prepare.
Also, unlike individual tax practitioners, software developers do not
review the completed returns of their customers. Thus, irrespective of
its magnitude or conspicuousness, the software developer will not discover the error after the commission. Since the developer cannot discover errors after their commission, society seems justified in imposing
a higher standard on developers to prevent errors from occurring in the
first place.
In addition, software developers enjoy at least two advantages over
individual tax practitioners. First, software developers may include in
their programs cross-checking schemes to catch frequent errors. Second, the program will operate consistently for each use. This allows the
developer to anticipate problems beforehand and test for possible errors. Once the program is proven to be error-free it will continue to be
for each subsequent use.
ii. Frequency of Errors
An isolated error may result in the assertion of a preparer penalty
if the error is sufficiently obvious, flagrant, or material. Yet, generally
the IRS will not impose a negligence penalty for an isolated error.'"
On the other hand, a pattern of errors on a return is presumptive of
negligence.145 Generally a pattern of errors will result in the assertion
of the penalty though no single error occurring in isolation would have
triggered the penalty. 146
A malfunction in a program is likely to result in an erroneous result in all returns used for the same purpose. The court must then decide whether this is an isolated error. All the understatements may
have resulted from one bug in the program, but there is a pattern of
errors since the bug caused understatements in multiple returns. The
best and the most likely answer is that it will be considered a pattern of
errors. 147
iii. Materiality of Errors
The IRS will generally not impose a negligence penalty if the understatement is immaterial since an error resulting in an immaterial
143. Weinstein, The Performance Audit Minimizing Software Liability (Part I), 29
IDEA 127, 131 (1988).
144. Rev. Proc. 80-40, 1980-2 C.B. 774, 775.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. See Rev. Rul. 80-263, 1980-2 C.B. 376.
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understatement will not be as great an indication of negligence as a similar error resulting in a material understatement. 148 Yet, the understatement, though immaterial, may result in the assertion of the
penalty if the error or errors creating the understatement are suffi149
ciently obvious, flagrant, or numerous.
Revenue Procedure 80-40 does not give any examples, measurements, or stated percentages of materiality. Yet, as part of the 1989 Act,
Congress added section 6662, which imposes penalties for "substantial"'150 understatements of tax liability. Section 6662 fixes "substantial"
as ten percent of the tax required to be shown on the return or $5,000
for taxpayers other than corporate taxpayers, whichever is greater.
Although it is unclear whether the courts will interpret materiality to
be ten percent, the IRS and the courts generally consider five percent
5
or less to be immaterial.' '
At least one court has held that a $1,568.24 understatement, resulting from $6,576.22 of overstated losses from a subchapter S corporation
allocated to the shareholder, was material.'5 2 In Brockhouse v. United
States,153 the Seventh Circuit ruled that a $10,538.76 understatement of
taxes for an omitted income of $15,291.20 was material.
The liability standard will have a much harsher practical effect on
software developers than it has on individual preparers. This is true
since understatements produced by computer software will most likely
always be material insofar as errors should be aggregated from all returns using the program in question. 15 Thus, in developing the new
regulations for preparer penalties, the IRS should define "material" to
avoid any ambiguities.
iv. When the Penalty Will Not be Applied
Although all the relevant facts and circumstances may suggest negligence, the IRS has indicated that it will not assert a preparer penalty
under the following two circumstances.lss First, the IRS will generally
not apply a penalty if the preparer's normal office practices suggest that
the error in question would rarely occur. Second, the IRS generally
148. See Rev. Proc. 80-40, 1980-2 C.B. 774, 775.
149. Id.
150. The IRS often uses the words "material" and "substantial" interchangeably. See
Rev. Proc. 80-262, supra note 142.
151. Arzoo, PreparerPenaltiesand Compliance, THE TAX ADVIsER, Jan. 1987, at 38.
152. Id. (citing Meyer Papermaster, E.D. Wisc., 1980 (47 AFTR 2d 81-1552), aff'd by
court order, 7th Cir., 1982).
153. 749 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1984).
154. See supra note 138.
155. Rev. Proc. 80-40, 1980-2 C.B. 774, 775.
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will not impose a penalty where a preparer relies in good faith upon information furnished by the taxpayer.

A)

Normal Offce Practices

The IRS will generally not apply a penalty if the preparer's normal
office practices, when considered with other facts and circumstances,
suggest that the error in question would rarely occur. 156 In addition,
the preparer must show that s/he followed normal office practices in
preparing the return in question. Examples of normal office practices,
as applied to individual preparers, include: 1) a system to promote accuracy and consistency in the preparation of returns, such as a checklist;
2) a method for obtaining the necessary information from the taxpayer;
3) an examination of the prior year's return; and 4) review
157
procedures.
Even the best office procedures are no defense against flagrant errors, or a pattern of errors either on a particular return or an error repeated on many returns.158

Revenue Procedure 80-263159 illustrates

that a pattern of errors, though immaterial, may be material when
taken together. In the IRS ruling, the preparer did not list all income
shown on a taxpayer's Forms 1099-INT and 1099-DIV, incorrectly totaled itemized deductions, and used the wrong tax table. The IRS
stated, "[a]Ithough each error, if the sole error on the return, would not
result in the imposition of the penalty, all the errors taken together
suggest that the return was negligently prepared."0 The IRS rejected
the preparer's argument that his normal office practice, considered with
other facts and circumstances, suggested that the errors in question
would rarely occur. The IRS stated, "in this situation the normal office
practice of the preparer will not relieve them [sic] from the penalty because there is a pattern of errors."'161 This statement is in contrast to
Revenue Ruling 80-262,162 where the IRS ruled that no negligence penalty would be imposed for an inadvertent error when the error did not
result in a substantial understatement of tax and it was the only error
on the return.
Revenue Ruling 80-264163 illustrates an instance in which a
preparer's normal office practices, taken with other factors, will prevent
the penalty from being imposed. The income tax preparer did not re156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

I&
Id.
Id.
1980-2 C.B. 376.
Id.
Id.
1980-2 C.B. 375.
1980-2 C.B. 377.
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port a substantial minimum tax liability resulting from a net capital
gain deduction shown on the individual taxpayer's return. Although
this was the only error on the return, the IRS determined that the facts
and circumstances suggested negligence by the preparer. The IRS reasoned that the understatement was substantial and that someone could
have discovered the error by reviewing the return. The preparer's only
defense was that his normal office practice was to apply the minimum
tax provisions correctly. The preparer presented a checklist that
showed when the minimum tax must be considered. The preparer's
work papers indicated that someone had reviewed the checklist. The
IRS found that the error would rarely occur based upon the knowledge
of the taxpayer, the internal procedures for review, and other facts and
circumstances. Since the error was not flagrant, the IRS ruled that the
preparer was not liable for a penalty for negligently disregarding the
rules and regulations.
As an analogue to office practices, computer software companies
could be judged on the quality control procedures of their products.
Yet, in reality, this exception will very rarely apply because any error
that results from a program bug will be repeated on many returns. All
the errors taken together will suggest negligence by the software developer. In addition, it would not be very effective to consider the office
practices of software developers. Just as in private negligence actions
against computer manufacturers, the difficult question is what standard
of care to apply to software developers. As mentioned above, most commentators agree that the current lack of articulated competence standards in the programming industry makes the familiar techniques of
framing a uniform standard futile. 164 The relative youth of the computer industry prevents courts from adequately relying on trade custom
and usage to decide if the developer's normal office practices, when considered with other facts and circumstances, suggest that the error in
question would rarely occur. It would be equally difficult for the developer to show that s/he followed normal office practices in preparing the
return in question. Finally, no professional codes of conduct or industry
standards exist to guide software developers. 165 Thus, courts have little
guidance since they cannot rely on common practices of others in the
industry to form a standard of care. 166
B)

Good Faith Reliance on Information Provided by the Taxpayer
Secondly, the penalty under section 6694(a) of the Code generally

164. Frank, Tort Adjudication and the Emergence of Artiftcial Intelligence Software,
21 SuFFoLK U.L. REV. 623, 629 (1987).
165. Id.
166. Id.
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will not apply where an individual tax preparer relies in good faith
upon information furnished by the taxpayer. 167 Thus, the tax preparer
need not audit, examine, or review books and records, business operations or documents, or other evidence to independently verify the taxpayer's information. Yet, the preparer may not ignore the implications
of information furnished to the preparer or the information the
preparer already knew. The preparer should make reasonable inquiries
if the information as furnished appears incorrect or incomplete. Additionally, some sections of the Code require the existence of specific facts
and circumstances, such as maintenance of specific documents, before a
deduction may be properly claimed.
The Seventh Circuit, in Brockhouse v. United States,16 held that "a
taxpayer negligently disregards a rule or regulation under section
6694(a) if his or her negligent failure to inquire into information provided by the taxpayer results in the filing of a return that violates a
rule or regulation."'169 The tax preparer in Brockhouse was a C.P.A.
who prepared returns for a professional corporation and for the corporation's sole shareholder. The corporation had deducted interest paid to
the shareholder, but the shareholder did not give this information to
the C.P.A. when the C.P.A. prepared his individual returns. The tax
preparer never asked whether any of the interest expense shown on the
corporate trial balance sheet was paid to the taxpayer. In fact, the corporation had paid the shareholders interest income in the amount of
$15,291.20, which they did not report on their return. This resulted in
an underpayment of federal income taxes of $10,538.76.
The court in reaching its conclusion addressed the applicable standard of care. The court stated that negligence in this context is generally a "lack of due care or failure to do what a reasonable and ordinarily
prudent person would do under the circumstances.' 170 The court noted
that section 6694(b), relating to willful disregard of rules or regulations,
expressly provides that a preparer may not rely without verification on
information supplied by the taxpayer if that information appears incomplete or incorrect. 171 While the regulation under section 6694(a) does
not contain such an express provision, the court noted that it does provide that a preparer is not negligent if he or she "exercises due diligence in an effort to apply the rules and regulations to the information
given" to him or her.172 The court interpreted the due diligence re167. Rev. Proc. 80-40, 1980-2 C.B. 775.
168. 749 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1984).
169. Id- at 1251.
170. Id. (quoting Marcello v. Commissioner, 380 F.2d 499, 506 (5th Cir. 1967), cert denied, 389 U.S. 1044 (1968)).
171. Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-1(b)(2)(ii) (1990).
172. Id. § 1.6694-1(a)(1).
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quirement to mean that a preparer must act as a reasonable and prudent person with respect to the information supplied to the preparer.
The court held that "if the information supplied would lead a reasonable, prudent preparer to seek additional information, it is negligent not
to do so. A reasonably prudent preparer would inquire about additional
information where apparently the information supplied was incorrect
or incomplete and it is simple to collect the necessary additional information."'1 73 The court found that the facts here supported the district
court's finding that the tax preparer was negligent in not asking
whether any of the interest paid by the corporation was paid to the sole
174
shareholder.
A court will not likely find that a developer of tax-preparation
software was negligent because it failed to inquire into information provided by the taxpayer which resulted in the filing of return that violated a rule or regulation. First, under existing technology the software
program will neither be able to ascertain the implications of the information the taxpayer furnishes nor have any existing knowledge about
the taxpayer which s/he has not entered into the computer. Second,
computer software has far less capability to determine that the information furnished appears incorrect or incomplete. Finally, the computer
program has no means of ensuring that a taxpayer possesses the necessary documents before claiming a particular deduction. One possible
exception is that the IRS may find that an expert rule based program
did not contain the appropriate inquiries in order to find facts and circumstances to determine that the taxpayer was eligible to take a particular deduction. Here, the practical application of the negligence
provisions may result in the penalty being imposed much less on
software developers. Software is not yet so sophisticated that it can
handle situations like this as effectively as a human actor. Also, as discussed above, rule-based expert systems should be encouraged as a mat175
ter of public policy.
b.

Policy Reasons for a StricterPracticalAffect

The negligence standard, as it applies to developers of tax-preparation software, is a much stricter standard. Its practical effect approaches a standard akin to strict liability. Although a stricter standard
may have a chilling affect on the development of software, there are no
redeeming social benefits from negligent behavior. Here there are no
conflicts of interest. Neither the government nor the taxpayer benefits
from errors in a computer program. Imposition of the civil penalties is
173. Brockhouse, 749 F.2d at 1252.

174. Id
175. See supra Section IV.B.2.
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no greater burden on the software developers than the marketplace itself imposes. The penalties will just work quicker to eliminate errorprone software. In the long run, intense competition between software
developers will probably be a much greater motivator to produce errorfree software than the threat of civil tax penalties. In addition, the
stricter practical application of the negligence standard follows from
general negligence principles.
For instance, it is often difficult to figure out what a reasonable
person would have done in a particular situation. In response, the
courts have developed a balancing test as a rough guide on whether a
defendant's conduct was so risky as to involve an unreasonable threat of
injury. Judge Learned Hand stated the most famous formulation of this
test in United States v. Carroll Towing Co. 176 Judge Hand stated that
liability would exist if the burden of what the defendant would have to
bear to avoid the liability was less than the gravity of the potential injury times the probability that the harm will occur from defendant's
conduct. 17 7 Thus, if a reasonable person would realize that a potential
injury, if it came to pass, would be extremely severe, there would be liability though it was relatively unlikely to occur. Burden on the defendant depends not only on the cost to the defendant to avoid the harm but
also on the broader social utility of the conduct which society would
have to forego.
With tax-preparation software, the burden of the civil tax penalties
would impose no greater burden than currently imposed by market
functions. The burden of reducing the probability of error is also much
less. Once the program is tested and verified, the program will operate
consistently with each use. It will not be prone to careless errors like
an individual tax-practitioner. The social utility from allowing error
prone software is very small, if any at all. The likelihood of error is
much greater since the error will repeat itself for all taxpayers using
this function of the software program. Also, the severity of harm that
results from a single error will be greater because of the same reason.
Because the error will be repeated on many returns this will result in a
much greater loss of revenue to the federal government than a single
error by an individual tax-practitioner.
Finally, the policy arguments for imposing strict liability in tort
also support a stricter application of the preparer penalties for negligence. First, the consumer relies on the skill and judgment of the
software developer. Consumer reliance in the area of computers and in
tax may be higher because these areas are beyond the comprehension of
the lay consumer. Second, software developers are in the best position
176. 159 F.2d 169 (2nd Cir. 1947).
177. Id. at 173.
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to avoid the harm. Third, the software developer may spread the risk of
error by adjusting its sales price. Finally, the developer placed the
product in the stream of commerce and thus it is justifiable to require
the developer to bear the risk of the error. Under strict liability, developers will have a greater incentive to act to avoid errors.
V.

CONCLUSION

The use of tax-preparation software will continue to increase with
the growth of electronic filing of federal income tax returns. Additionally, the complexities of tax-preparation software will continue to increase with the advances in technology and, thus, according to the IRS,
become more risky. Both these factors will put additional pressure on
the IRS to provide guidelines as to how it intends to apply the civil tax
preparer penalties to developers of tax-preparation software. This Note
has taken the position that the IRS does not need to develop different
theories of liability for individual tax preparers and developers of taxpreparation software. Yet, this Note does recognize that, in practice,
identical standards of liability will probably result in stricter application
to software developers when the understatement is caused by the developer's negligence. The IRS should specifically address how the
preparer penalties will be applied to software developers when it updates the regulations.
The preparer penalties, as they are currently written, will serve to
meet the competing goals of expanding electronic filing while protecting the integrity of the tax system. The current standard of liability is
strict enough to motivate both the production and the use of more error
free software. Yet, the standard is not so strict as to have a chilling effect on both the development and the use of tax-preparation software.
This Note has taken the position that all developers of tax-preparation
software irrespective of their level of sophistication because the level of
sophistication is not likely to have an effect on the taxpayer's reliance
on the program in producing their tax returns. This Note suggests that
the penalties are necessary because competitive market forces and the
availability of private causes of action by taxpayers are not sufficient to
protect the integrity of the tax system.
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